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Abstract: Marilyn Strathern’s body of work is here analysed in its ‘partial connections’ to queer thinking, 
from an inescapably political dimension. The chapter engages in a work of reassemblage, making 
Strathern’s reflections compatible with those of Judith Butler and therefore also pointing to, and working 
through, their incomparabilities and limits. It is an exercise in cyborg-making, which draws on 
Strathern’s engagement with the work of Donna Haraway, operated by assembling two of Strathern’s 
terrains of inquiry in dialogue to queer thinking: institutional and disciplinary practices, on the one hand, 
and the awkward relations between feminist/Marxist theories and anthropological description, on the 
other. Here, issues of transgression and its aporias, and the necessarily relational character of 
identification, are interrogated for how they can guide the development of an insurgent mode of 
knowledge production which is founded on risk, vulnerability and the conscious search for a future that 
is already present in abject form. This, it is argued, cannot but mean dealing with politics in the ruins of 
university disciplines and institutions. 
Marilyn Strathern: … what is it then that I substitute for religion that 
might have the same effect on my intellectual life? I think I would say 
an interest and love of institutions.2 […] I suspect that those aspects of 
religion that inspire social scientists are indeed those aspects to do with 
the ecclesiastical organization of religious life, as it were, regardless of 
what belief systems are involved. And if you were to look for a 
counterpart of that in my own life I would say that I have always liked 
being in contexts where there was organized life around me. I like being 
in hospital, for example, find that very relaxing – it depends on what 
one’s in for, but I’m not frightened by the notion of institution as such. I 
enjoyed departmental life from the organizational demands that it 
makes. I am clearly very much a college person and I’ve enjoyed being 
in the institution. So that is where I think in my own life I might echo 
where people with religion might find some inspiration for being 
interested in how people arrange their social relations. 
Alan MacFarlane (interviewer): Is this the same as ritual? Because a lot of 
(particularly Jewish) people I interviewed say that of course dogma and 
the intellectual side is unimportant in their lives, they are secular Jews, 
but the rituals gave a pattern and meaning to their lives – is that really 
what you’re talking about, the patterning of life for Jews, symbolic 
elements, or is the social relations of the institution that really appeal to 
you, being part of a team? 
 
1 I would like to thank Eirini Avramopoulou, Paolo Heywood, Ashley Lebner and the editors of 
this volume for their insightful comments on earlier drafts, which greatly helped clarifying and 
sharpening my argument. 
2 All italics in the interview excerpt are mine, and are meant for emphasis.  
 Strathern: I think it has to be both, and what is … or what I found about 
the ritualisation aspect (particularly in college but also elsewhere), or 
aspects of it, and … – my mind slides over to bureaucracy, it starts 
taking … goes off in different tangents – but if you keep to the benign 
rituals, like for example having a seminar at 5 o’clock on a Friday 
afternoon, then what I … a particular pleasure I derive is the 
relationship one has to a convention, where one willingly follows a 
convention, but in such a way that in no way impinges on one’s 
autonomy. In other words it’s a discipline, it’s a willing submission to a 
convention for the pleasure of the convention, but at the same time one 
is conscious of oneself very much, it’s not as if one disappears 
underneath the convention but on the contrary one is an active 
participant. And I have always found the relationship between person 
and office – which is what I discuss in this contribution to Cambridge 
Anthropology – an actual source of intellectual pleasure, something that 
I enjoy managing. 
[…] 
MacFarlane: In a recent piece you wrote for … I think to be published in 
Cambridge Anthropology, which is a reply to something I wrote, you 
put forward the (as usual) counterintuitive argument that there wasn’t 
enough bureaucracy in the post of Head of Department of Social 
Anthropology and so on. Could you explain what you were arguing 
there? 
Strathern: I was following a particular writer who laments the demise of 
old-style civil service and of the notion of a bureaucracy as a service 
order within government, distinct from politics. And what is being 
lamented is the personalization of administrators, the extent to which 
civil servants these days are meant to have ownership of their projects 
as opposed to being very much personally involved and so forth. So that 
what is regretted is not bureaucracy per se, but this very particular form 
of understanding in the Civil Service that there were procedures and 
principles that, as it were, saved one from the effects of too much 
personal investment in what was going on. One of the things I do 
mention there is that some of the functions of that old-style bureaucracy 
you find not these days in bureaucrats, but in some of the techniques 
they surround themselves with. So one of our problems in the current 
era, when we feel oppressed by what we might call bureaucracy, is not 
so much the activities of individuals but it is the kinds of programmes 
that are set up that we have to conform to. So for example the head of 
 department has a constant sort of pro-forma things to be filled in, where 
only certain answers to questions will do because otherwise the machine 
throws them out or whatever. And I think this is a new – well, I 
shouldn’t be evaluative about it I’m sure, but it’s certainly a new way of 
dealing with process and procedure. 
[…] 
The University [of Cambridge] is running (well, you know!), it’s 
running in many epochs, you know, there is a monastic culture, there is 
an eighteenth-century coffee-room culture, there’s a corridor culture, 
there’s a nineteenth-century entrepreneurialism, there’s twentieth-
century management, and these things are all running simultaneously, 
and it makes it a very complex place. And that of course keeps it 
creative. The complexity means that there are all kinds of metaphorical 
corners and nooks and crannies that allow idiosyncratic procedures (or 
used to) to flourish. 
(Interview given in 2009, part of 
Cambridge historian-anthropologist Alan 
MacFarlane’s series on ‘leading 
thinkers’)3 
Strathern+Butler, via Haraway: Assembling, disassembling, reassembling cyborgs 
The article cited in the interview above (Strathern, 2009), alongside this exchange itself, 
speak to foundational issues within queer politics, if ‘counterintuitively’ – in 
characteristic Strathernian fashion, as MacFarlane would have it. Indeed, queer as a 
philosophy of praxis may be seen to work at cross angles from Strathern’s project, and 
it is with this intersection, which is also an interference, that I am concerned. I work 
through a feedback loop that allows to recursively play out one set of arguments against 
the other and thereby reconfigure them, showing how ‘queer’ can be both an effect and 
a source of some of the challenges that Strathern addresses, whilst both contain their 
own unresolved conflicts. Her long-standing (self-)reflections, in which the project of 
anthropological knowledge production stands in awkward and oblique dialogue with 
the concerns of feminism, Marxism and the critique of neoliberal bureaucratic power, 
among others, are both superseded by and incorporated into queer thinking. Yet, their 
encounter may produce new reverberations and ripples. In a sense, the assemblage I am 
about to conjure up is also anachronistic, or perhaps cannibalistic – feeding on and into 
its own previous parts. 
Thus, articulating Strathern’s reflections to queer thought means confronting what 
looks like a novel rehearsal of the ‘awkwardness’ that she herself identified between 
feminism and anthropology (Strathern 1987; 1988; 2004 [1991]), one that has been 
displaced onto new grounds. The terms of such awkward relation have changed along 
with the reconfigurations of institutions and disciplines themselves, as it is only natural 
to expect. What follows is thus an attempt to elaborate on and extend those ‘partial 
 
3 Available at http://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1130673, retrieved 19 March 2017 
 connections’ with which Marilyn Strathern (2004) productively experimented, an 
operation I conceive as a work of constant assembling and disassembling for the sake 
of making disparate elements compatible, cyborg-style, in an attempt at subversion 
against totalisation. 
In order to proceed with this work of assemblage it is necessary to choose one’s parts 
carefully, knowing that both scales and sides matter. As a way to ‘capacitate modes of 
life currently around us but without an explicit force among us’, this is, by definition, a 
risky enterprise, full of potentiality and exhaustion (Povinelli 2012, 454). I begin with 
two authors and their intellectual corpus – already complex and composite entities 
within themselves: Judith Butler and Marilyn Strathern. Yet, for this process to be 
accomplished it will be necessary to make partial connections also to and through the 
intellectual production of Donna Haraway, and particularly to the concept of cyborg as 
the central image of ‘an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and 
materialism’ (1988, 149). Haraway’s conceptualisation is one of the principal 
inspirations for what can rightfully be considered as a method as well as a position. 
According to Strathern, the image of Haraway’s cyborg is what best renders the 
endeavour of partial connection-making. It is a way to extend the capacities of each 
part, where the latter cannot be subsumed under a coherent whole, but will always 
belong to different orders – and where the extension of capacities is to be understood 
against totalising fantasies and practices of domination, oppression and diminution. 
In a sense, Butler and Strathern, like Haraway, seem to belong to the same scale and 
part in more than one way, as their productions have been spawned in parallel, and in 
some cases even in dialogue, since the dawn of ‘the postplural’ (Strathern 1992) and of 
queer (Butler 1990) on the horizon of critical reflection. They intersected and even 
contaminated each other in several occasions, in books and elsewhere. Strathern’s work 
clearly contributed to the elaboration of Butler’s queer thinking, most directly by 
unsettling the stable opposition between nature and culture which was foundational to 
much feminist thinking in the 1970s.4 
Assembling awkward cyborgs is an explicitly queer operation, insofar as it is about 
transgressed boundaries, not only those between human and animal, between human-
animal and machine, and between the physical and the non-physical, but indeed those 
between man and woman, in both their sex and gender dimensions – it is 
an effort to contribute to socialist-feminist culture and theory in a 
postmodernist, non-naturalist mode and in the utopian tradition of imagining a 
world without gender, which is perhaps a world without genesis, but maybe also 
a world without end. […] The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has 
 
4 Butler explicitly draws on McCormack and Strathern’s (1980) widely known collection in her 
seminal Gender Trouble (1990, 37), to begin her questioning of the naturalisation of sex. This is the 
most obvious, even plain, way in which Strathern’s anthropology (and not only hers) contributed to the 
elaboration of queer thinking. Much later (2016a), Butler will acknowledge Strathern’s contribution to 
feminist theory even more extensively and explicitly. On her part, Strathern draws on Butler’s thought 
less self-consciously, but see her intervention as chair of Judith Butler’s discussion of ‘Psychoanalysis 
and Feminism: A Radical Assessment of Freudian Psychoanalysis (Mitchell 1974)’, part of 
‘Oppression & Revolution: A Symposium in honour of Juliet Mitchell’s retirement from the University 
of Cambridge’ (Centre for Gender Studies, University of Cambridge, 2009). In that occasion, I recall 
Butler’s surprised reaction to Strathern’s characterisation of her thought as ‘pragmatist’ – perhaps a 
hint to that awkward relationship on which I reflect here. 
 no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other 
seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers 
of the parts into a higher unity. 
(Haraway 1988, 150 – cf. also 176, 180–1) 
Yet, drawing partial connections means avoiding ‘assumptions of comparability’ 
(Strathern 2004, 38). To be assembled as a cyborg, parts need to display the characters 
of incomparability which define the exercise of making them compatible for a clearly 
partisan project (Haraway 1988). Hence, all three components in this experiment at 
cyborg assembling (Strathern and Butler, via Haraway) may be connected only through 
some radical difference, which however needs to be actively worked – after all, the 
connections are manifest. 
This might, then, begin as another rehearsal, or a revitalisation, of the now decades-old 
dilemma of awkward relations. It is not really an innovative attempt but rather a 
contemplation of an already assembled cyborg, or meta-cyborg. However, 
contemplation from a situated position, and as a performative act in itself, is necessarily 
an addition to, or reassemblage of, the cyborg, queer style. It is a queer act, if queer can 
be stretched to encompass resignification of norms that do not pertain (or not only) to 
the domain of sexuality (as indeed Butler herself acknowledges, for example in 
articulating sex to race in Bodies that Matter; cf. Halley and Parker 2007; Boellstorff 
and Howe 2015; and Boellstorff 2010 on queer as method), and if we then take 
Strathern’s, Haraway’s and Butler’s bodies of thought as ever-redeployable tools to 
rework ‘abjection into political agency’ (Butler 1993, xxv). Contemplating 
Strathern+Butler as a cyborg, through Haraway’s conceptual device, means 
regenerating and extending ‘them’ as bodies of thought, as Haraway would have 
cyborgs do. Thus, of course, if we are still to identify an awkwardness, this is inevitably 
displaced from where it was originally spotted. 
In the first place, going back to the interview with which I opened my reflections, the 
relation between what Strathern calls persons and their roles, which she characterises 
as a twentieth-century mode of discipline founded on the willing adherence to a 
summoning order, is addressed by Butler for what it leaves in its shadow. From queer 
perspectives, it is non-adherence to the norm that must be attended to, in relation to an 
architecture of power relations that reproduce themselves through constitutively 
frustrated attempts to satisfy their interpellations. In doing so, they point not only to the 
ways in which norms are reproduced by their negation, but also explore the potential of 
subversion inherent in inhabiting the law from the position of the abject. Thereby, a 
space is opened up in which different ways of relating can be recuperated for an 
insurgent politics, here and now. 
In queer terms, there are no pretensions to the ‘separation from an antithetical Other 
which [feminists] desire’ (Strathern 1987, 290) – the transgressive posture which 
constituted the object of anthropology’s mockery of feminism according to Strathern. 
That Other, the prohibitive paternal law, is seen to function in its very failures, in a 
perpetual play between repression and transgression which reproduces order. Butler’s 
queer theory seeks to go beyond the ‘singular and prohibitive’ account of the Law, ‘a 
fictive and repressive notion’ (Butler 1990, 156 fn. 51), and rather speaks to the 
possibility of enacting an identification that displays its very own phantasmatic 
structure, and therefore the radical, constitutive impossibility of the law’s prohibitions 
and demands (Ibid., 31) – which is, at the same time, the mechanism of its reproduction. 
 In this sense, there is no such thing as an ‘ethical bureaucrat’ in keeping to the book. 
Transgression, here, is the starting point rather than the end goal. 
[T]he contentious practices of ‘queerness’ might be understood not only as an 
example of citational politics, but as a specific reworking of abjection into 
political agency that might explain why ‘citationality’ has contemporary 
political promise. The public assertion of ‘queerness’ enacts performativity as 
citationality for the purposes of resignifying the abjection of homosexuality into 
defiance and legitimacy. I argue that this does not have to be a ‘reverse-
discourse’ in which the defiant affirmation of queer dialectically reinstalls the 
version it seeks to overcome. Rather, this is the politicization of abjection in an 
effort to rewrite the history of the term, and to force it into a demanding 
resignification […]. If there is a ‘normative’ dimension to this work, it consists 
precisely in assisting a radical resignification of the symbolic domain, deviating 
the citational chain toward a more possible future to expand the very meaning 
of what counts as a valued and valuable body in the world. 
(Butler 1993, xxv–vi) 
In fact, Butler sees the kernel of such an approach already at play in Strathern’s early 
reflections on gender, published only very recently (2016 [1974]): the displacement of 
stereotypes through their embodiment, the phantasmatic character of role descriptions 
and the ensuing possibilities for mimicry and critical reflection, as well as the different 
forms of attachment to fantasy (Butler 2016a, 296–9). And yet, here is where some gap 
opens between Strathern’s and Butler’s thought, and thus where the cyborg-assembling 
work might begin. 
The concept of subversion and the cognate one of transgression, whilst for the most part 
not directly addressed by Strathern in her analyses, may be seen to underlie many of 
her musings – on feminist politics inside and outside academia, and on the foundations 
of such thought and praxis within the dyadic matrix of individual and society. Much of 
Strathern’s work was devoted to questioning the juxtaposition of the logic of a freedom-
constraining power upon relations and dynamics – most notably those that accrue in 
Melanesian contexts – that seemed to follow different preoccupations entirely. By 
reference to a ‘Melanesian’ perspective on feminist-anthropological concerns, 
Strathern has conjured up a vision in which 
gender is not construed as a role ‘imposed’ on individuals ‘by culture’. 
Conversely, there is no problem about membership ‘in society’ or one’s fitness 
to participate in the social contract. There is no anxiety, pace Mead, about 
whether or not one’s attributes will qualify one for this or that role. Anxiety, so 
to speak, is not so much about the control of behavior (people’s ‘freedom’) but 
about how their behavior will appear to others (their ‘performance’). 
 (Strathern 1988, 324) 
What is left of ‘politics’ from this perspective, then? Strathern shows how the language 
of rights attendant to (at least a certain) activism is premised on a vision of persons as 
self-owners and as singularly responsible for the production of, and thus entitled to, 
goods through their work and labour (Ibid., ch. 6; 2016 [1974]; cf. Green, 2016 on how 
this was the case in late-1980s feminist separatism in London). Yet, as Carol Pateman 
(1988) among many others reminds us, both Marxian (and in some cases Marxist) and 
some strands of feminist thought openly reject the view that individuals as self-owners 
can be foundational to a politics of liberation. The discipline of anthropology, and 
Strathern’s work within it, has arguably contributed to forge this critique. For Pateman, 
however, as for many others, the solution is one of upholding limits to freedom in the 
name of an autonomy which is yet again predicated on the integrity of an unviolated, 
unitary self (attributed with binary sexual difference) that arguably still draws from 
individualist Enlightenment philosophy (Szörényi 2014). 
Reacting against such a stance, Butler’s more recent work has sought to conceptualise 
a radical politics based on the recognition of mutual interdependence, understood in 
terms of vulnerability (e.g. 2004; 2016b). For Butler, the impasse of individualism and 
its attendant identity politics is overcome, again also referencing Strathern’s writing 
and thinking, if relationality as interdependence is taken as the grounding for 
identification (2016a, 300–2). At the same time, however, Butler’s is a stance in which 
resistance, the play between individual freedom and social constraint, is very much at 
stake – as it is for queer and gender theory more generally (Povinelli 2007). To what 
extent, then, is her thinking incorporating, partially connecting to, the ‘Melanesian’ one, 
in Strathern’s sense – and should it? And to what extent is Strathern’s thinking and 
dealing with institutions transcending the postulates of individual, autonomous 
selfhood? 
To put it very bluntly, we could say that whilst (part of) Strathern’s work was dedicated 
to understand the meanings and uses of exploitation attendant to specific constructions 
of personhood (Melanesian – as perceived, imagined and crafted from the point of view 
of a ‘Euro-American’ anthropological discipline devoted to making partial 
connections), in which ‘resistance’ can only take interpersonal or nonhuman form,5 for 
Butler the main question is to re-define, in an activist sense, the meanings of resistance 
and selfhood. Butler’s thinking is self-consciously inscribed within, and against, a 
specific genealogy, that of heteronormative, patriarchal, Enlightenment thought, in 
which exploitation is understood as a wounding violence, which appropriates and 
excludes. Butler’s and Strathern’s work thus meet at cross angles – hence the 
awkwardness, and the potential for partial connection.6 
 
5  Strathern writes: ‘As I understand Melanesian concepts of sociality, there is no indigenous 
supposition of a society that lies over or above or is inclusive of individual acts and unique events. 
There is no domain that represents a condensation of social forces controlling elements inferior or in 
resistance to it. The imagined problems of social existence are not those of an exteriorized set of norms, 
values, or rules that must be constantly propped up and sustained against realities that constantly 
appear to subvert them. People are subverted by the actions of other people. Or they are attacked by 
nonhuman forces forever beyond their reach. The world is not mapped into spheres of influence, into 
adjacent and competitive empires. Nor do people envision a hierarchy of levels whose final battle 
ground is the subduing of the human body’ (Strathern 1988, 102, emphasis mine) 
6 I see this as a way to overcome the distinction between different ‘Others’ which Strathern 
posits in her rendition of the awkward relation, which from my own vantage point do not (any longer) 
constitute mutually exclusive forms of subjectivation but rather can be articulated to each other. 
Strathern defines anthropology’s ‘Other’ as a sort of subaltern figure, whilst feminism’s own, in her 
rendition, is individualist, Western patriarchal law. I would say that in post-disciplinary times such 
 Within these incompatible starting points, Butler’s awkward relations with Strathern 
also lie in the former’s reliance on a decidedly psychoanalytical account of how gender 
norms are internalised, which she pits against a sociological one. ‘[W]hereas for the 
latter, the internalisation of norms is assumed roughly to work, the basic premise and 
indeed starting point of psychoanalysis is that it does not’ (Rose, cited in Butler 1990, 
156, fn. 51), such that ‘insurrections’ against the law are somewhat to be expected. In 
fact, for Butler subjectivation is always and necessarily a matter of ex-centricity in 
relation to a symbolic order which is by definition unattainable. If ‘Melanesians’ can 
only be described as being concerned with other sorts of issues, when dealing with 
‘Euro-Americans’ (or ‘the English’) Strathern is rather interested in accounting for how 
individuals make their relations in ‘society’, or indeed how they conceive of 
‘relatedness’ and thus only obliquely, if at all, touching on the impossible relation 
between subject and symbolic law, and thus on the phantasmatic character of the 
individual. Considering this gap would amount to undertaking a work of interpretation, 
of reading between the lines (in considering the type of attachments of the person to the 
office, as it were), which is antithetical to Strathern’s understanding of the task of 
anthropology as ‘redescription’ (Lebner 2017a),7 or to addressing the psychoanalytical 
discourse head on as cultural script which complexifies the notion of individuals and 
individuation by reference to desire, which simply she has not done. 
Furthermore, the notion of discipline, which Strathern defines in rather specific, narrow 
(classical?) terms as a willing act of submission to an institution, in fact identifies a sort 
of anachronism, perhaps a ‘postplural nostalgia’ (cf. Strathern 1992, 186–98). 
Discipline is particularly good to think with when reflecting on the political aspects of 
intellectual production, as it immediately foregrounds that exertion of power through 
the institution, to which Strathern reveals her attachment. At the same time, ‘discipline’ 
signals the acquisition of knowledge as a tool, indexing a process of learning by 
following, taking on, accepting, thus pointing to the open-ended possibilities of 
subjectification. 
Whilst of course disciplines are, like all modern social forms, inherently plural and 
diverse, I take the academic disciplinary order to be an instantiation of a more general 
form of institutional discipline. This of course has implications for anthropology in its 
disciplinary dimensions. Indeed, Strathern’s writings often proceed by self-consciously 
adopting the perspective afforded by anthropology as a discipline – also granting a 
definite (if internally plural) positionality to feminism as its counterpart (but not 
homologue). On the surface, then, Strathern’s insistence on disciplinary commitment is 
at odds with, for example, Butler’s explicit invoking, in one of the founding texts of 
queer thought and/as praxis, of an ‘interdisciplinary and postdisciplinary set of 
discourses in order to resist the domestication of women studies or gender studies 
within the academy and to radicalise the notion of feminist critique’ (1990: xi). And 
yet, of course, this being at odds is the foundation of the awkward relationship, in 
Strathern’s terms, for feminism there figures as necessarily internally diverse, 
transdisciplinary. Here I suggest some ways in which Strathern’s enjoyment of 
institutions, her disciplinary commitment, might regenerate and extend in queer 
 
alterities infinitely proliferate in any intellectual endeavour as opposite but complementary forms of 
self-defining difference. 
7 As Deiringer and Lebner quipped, Strathern’s anthropology aims ‘to comparatively study how 
we make things known to ourselves’ (2009, 3); or, in the words of Viveiros de Castro and Goldman, 
Strathern’s is ‘a perspectivist theory of description that takes as its privileged object the exchange of 
perspectives, which is of the same order as the relation between her discourse and that which she 
analyses’, in a ‘non-dialogic second person’ (2017, 183). 
 fashion, where ‘queer’ stands as the placeholder for a political situatedness, indeed a 
political challenge, within the domain of knowledge production and beyond. But I also 
stress the limitations of such exercise. 
From the position of the subject of power, discipline entails adherence to a pattern, a 
model of behaviour, and thus an identification with norms of some sort, which might 
appear as the un-queer process par excellence. However, not only is identification (the 
mechanism by which institutions, rules and laws continuously shape subjects) 
inevitable also from Butler’s perspective (e.g. 1990: 30), but if for Strathern, as she 
elaborates in the interview excerpt cited above, discipline is not necessarily loss of 
autonomy, one might imply it can in fact resist domestication in the sense Butler 
advocates. Indeed, in Strathern’s view it is in the gap opened up, in modern institutional 
cultures, between person and office – as in that between different institutional cultures 
and their temporal stratifications – that this autonomy (and the creativity it necessarily 
entails) can be fostered. 
This can, again, give some pause to those of us who have grown up, intellectually and 
politically, learning that ‘the personal is political’, that the public-private distinction is 
to be deconstructed, and that therefore there must always be at least one (and usually 
more) person(s) recognised as standing behind and within the office, that the (public) 
office cannot be fully separated from the (private) personal dimension which nurtures 
and re/produces it. To sustain this fiction of separateness, we learnt, was to reproduce 
an exploitative model founded on segregation. Moreover, a dubious sense of 
‘impartiality’ (another political anathema) lingers in the dutifully observed gap: 
The specific persona of the bureaucrat is of one who takes pride in preserving 
impartiality and overcoming his or her own opinions. The moral agency here 
involves initiative and independent judgment on the part of the incumbent, 
although it is an agency that has its source not in the individual but in 
institutionally given obligations. However, while authority comes from outside 
the individual, this does not mean that individuals doff and don personae at will. 
On the contrary, personal dedication to instituted (impersonal) purposes 
becomes an index of the bureaucrat’s ethical habitation of his or her office. 
(Strathern 2009, 132, paraphrasing du Gay) 
Yet, despite her hesitation in ‘being evaluative’ about change, when prompted to reflect 
on the evolution of the university’s structures Strathern laments the disappearance of 
the distinction between person and office. This amounts, perhaps, to the demise of 
discipline itself, or its displacement onto a machinic order where one has to conform to 
restrictive protocols (thereby re-articulating bureaucrats into cyborgs devoted to 
oppressive practices, one may say). In Foucauldian terms, we could tag this process as 
one in which individual discipline gets incorporated into, and transformed by, a 
governmental regime in which the managerial ethos takes prominence, in the university 
as elsewhere. In the era in which not only has the distinction between person and office 
collapsed, but where its ruins have been put to the service of new techniques of 
extraction, exclusion and accumulation, we must ask ourselves how to make the old 
feminist adage productive again, how to reclaim it from its appropriation and reversal 
by a neo-liberal regime which personalises the political (and the institutional), and 
 thereby neutralises its radical, subversive potential. How to re-wire the political-made-
personal into a utopian queer cyborg, beyond nostalgia? How to successfully mourn the 
death of modern disciplines and institutions? 
Despite their nostalgia, perhaps Strathern’s remarks about the autonomy afforded by 
discipline can give us a clue. Of course there are a number of ways in which they could 
be qualified – by pointing out that not all rituals are ‘benign’, for example (which she 
herself admits in the interview with MacFarlane, especially in relation to the new 
bureaucratic regime), and that disciplines are not always (or only) about willing 
adherence, or by questioning willing adherence itself as guarantee of autonomy: 
the bureaucratic/symbolic Institution not only reduces the subject to its 
mouthpiece, but also wants the subject to disavow the fact that he [sic] is merely 
its mouthpiece and to (pretend to) act as an autonomous agent – a person with a 
human touch and personality, not just a faceless bureaucrat. The point, of 
course, is not only that such an autonomization is doubly false, since it involves 
a double disavowal, but also that there is no subject prior to the Institution (prior 
to language as the ultimate institution): subjectivity is produced as the void in 
the very submission of the life-substance of the Real to the Institution. […] in 
an obsessional ritual, the very performance of the compulsive ritual destined to 
keep illicit temptation at bay becomes the source of libidinal satisfaction. 
(Žižek 1999, 258–61, passim) 
In this light we may ask whether, then, a post-disciplinary (governmental?) form of 
self-conduct might not also contain its own (kinky) pleasures and perks (cf. Butler 
1997), and hold possibilities for queering. This is where our current challenge lies. 
However one thinks about institutions’ interpellations, though, the point is hardly 
weakened that ‘loss of autonomy’ can never be full (except of course with the demise 
of the self) even in the face of harsh disciplinary demands. Resistance (and/as 
resignification, if we wish to follow Butler’s lead, not unlike Haraway’s own)8 is always 
a possibility, however costly and risky and however ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ it is deemed to 
be.9 Yet, all would agree (and this is the point of debating ‘politics’ in the first place) 
 
8 In Haraway’s terms, cyborg politics is also a form of writing, indeed writing is cyborgs’ pre-
eminent tool. It is about ‘seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other […] recoding 
communication and intelligence to subvert command and control’ (1988, 175), it is ‘the struggle for 
language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all 
meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism’ (176). 
9 Here authors such as Butler and Žižek famously diverge in their evaluations. For Žižek, 
Butler’s elaboration of a ‘performative reconfiguration of one’s symbolic condition via its repetitive 
displacements’ (1999, 264) is not as radical an act as it could get. Performative reconfiguration is ‘a 
subversive displacement which remains within the hegemonic field and, as it were, conducts an internal 
guerrilla war of turning the terms of the hegemonic field against itself’ (Ibid.), unlike ‘a much more 
radical act of a thorough reconfiguration of the entire field which redefines the very conditions of 
socially sustained performativity’ (Ibid.). However, he perhaps mistakes Butler’s idea of performativity 
as being predicated on transgression (which, on the contrary, Butler identifies as the normal procedure 
for subjection, as I later show) and does not quite explain how a radical act of thorough reconfiguration 
would essentially differ from queer performativity qua reiterative (rather than singular), redefining 
 that the self can never be reduced to the mere replication of structures over-determining 
her. This is an implication deriving from Butler’s arguments, of which we can hear 
echoes in Strathern’s bureaucratic pleasures and in her pointing to the ‘corners, nooks 
and crannies’ of thickly layered power structures – bearing in mind, of course, that 
Strathern’s stance, in her own words, is rather that of 
an academic, rather than activist, feminist. And that means, in the university 
context, that my concern is to reiterate the contributions that feminist 
scholarship has made in thinking about debates, especially in anthropology of 
course, but insisting very strongly, and it still needs to be insisted, that these are 
contributions to the intellectual project. But not as an activist, in the sense that 
I don’t in fact have a particularly well thought out [political] position that 
would translate into university dealings, except in a sort of modest way: while 
in the context of making appointments and the conduct of meetings and so forth, 
just being aware of gender issues. But, as I think you know … I am sensitive, 
but I am not terribly sensitive. It took me ages to appreciate the position [that 
women academics often have to occupy]. I think I’ve been protected as well … 
(interview with Carsten 2014, 273, emphases mine) 
In the light of the first interview cited at the beginning of the chapter, these are perhaps 
an instantiation of Strathern’s characteristic propensity to understatements. This – 
together with her embracing of awkwardness – makes ‘her’ (as a public persona, but 
one in which the ‘private’, intimate dimension does clearly surface, feminist style – 
witness the passage above) a product of her context, albeit one who has made itself 
queer through several contaminations and partial connections. After all, the ability and 
willingness to play through the gaps could be characterised as a political position, and 
a queer one at that. At the same time, this last passage points, I would argue, to a residual 
dualism (between the academic and the political) which remains partly 
unacknowledged in Strathern’s reflections on ‘awkwardness’. 
Yet, leaving aside for now the fraught distinction between intellectual and activist 
positions (especially within feminism), the productive side of ‘the law’ (of institutions, 
of power relations and their structuring effects) is something that we can identify in 
both Butler’s and Strathern’s work (as in that of many other influential thinkers, most 
notably Foucault in his re-reading of Nietzsche – cf. e.g. Foucault 1978). For Butler, 
speaking about the specific discipline that is sexuality, 
the postulation of a normative sexuality that is ‘before’, ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ 
power is a cultural impossibility and a politically impracticable dream, one that 
postpones the concrete and contemporary task of rethinking subversive 
possibilities of sexuality and identity within the terms of power itself. This 
 
acts. From a feminist point of view, advocating a ‘strong’, singular, redefining act sounds suspicious to 
say the least. 
 critical task presumes, of course, that to operate within the matrix of power is 
not the same as to replicate uncritically relations of domination. It offers the 
possibility of a repetition of the law which is not its consolidation but its 
displacement. 
(Butler 1990, 30) 
The notion of power at work in subjection […] appears in two incommensurable 
temporal modalities: first, as what is for the subject always prior, outside of 
itself, and operative from the start; second, as the willed effect of the subject. 
This second modality carries at least two sets of meanings: as the willed effect 
of the subject, subjection is a subordination that the subject brings on itself; yet 
if subjection produces a subject and a subject is the precondition of agency, then 
subjection is the account by which a subject becomes the guarantor of its 
resistance and opposition. […] what is enacted by the subject is enabled but not 
finally constrained by the prior working of power. Agency exceeds the power 
by which it is enabled. One might say that the purposes of power are not always 
the purposes of agency. […] agency is the assumption of a purpose unintended 
by power, one that could not have been derived logically or historically, that 
operates in a relation of contingency and reversal to the power that makes it 
possible, to which it nevertheless belongs. 
(Butler 1997, 14–15, passim) 
I take this to be, or suggest how it articulates with, what Marilyn Strathern refers to in 
her interviews and written accounts, reflecting on the roles, or offices, she held for 
decades within the university. It is also the premise for making of awkwardness, of 
cyborg-style assemblages, the principle governing thought and praxis more generally 
from a postplural/queer perspective. However, as anticipated, awkwardness must be 
located at a different place in the assemblage from where Strathern originally spotted 
it. 
Opening up this disconnect, this awkwardness, means positing the question of activism 
as directly related to that of social description, in a sense – that is, it is to ask exactly 
how we relate to norms and their impossible requests. We might love inhabiting modern 
institutions, mourn their demise, work through their nooks and crannies, probe and 
challenge them for their managerial practices which call for a self-defeating 
transparency. Indeed, despite Strathern’s shying away from activist subjectivity, there 
is of course an ‘active’ dimension to intellectual critique, including her own – words do 
things, as Butler is keen to remind us, and as many scholars and their writings have 
repeatedly proven through the centuries. In her own (characteristically modest) words, 
 Strathern conceives of her posture as ‘from time to time challenging conventional ways 
of thinking’.10 
Indeed, recent engagements with Strathern’s analytical strategies are beginning to 
address the latter’s political dimension in relation to critical redescription. They note 
the political implications of her reflections despite an apparent absence of specific 
references to politics as such, which is related to the deep embeddedness of such term 
within a specific intellectual tradition which Strathern seeks to de-centre and challenge 
(Lebner 2017a; 2017b). However, by directly engaging feminist thought, as well as 
Marxism (and the interlacing of the two), in her re-description of exploitation, of 
inequality and of exchange, most notably, but also in accounting for the workings of 
institutional-managerial cultures, Strathern arguably positions her work firmly at the 
centre of political debate, in a much more evident, if lateral, fashion than many accounts 
of her work are ready to acknowledge. 
Which discipline? Awkward politics, militant politics, anthro-politics 
Embarking in this reiterative experiment of cyborg assembling, I am of course making 
claims and taking my partial sides, both towards these domains of knowledge 
production, agentive in themselves, and in a wider sense. I am writing from a position 
in which not only have institutions in their modern(ist) form disaggregated (and then 
reassembled), to the point where we have been hearing of ‘the university in ruins’ for 
decades (Readings, 1997), but where one’s attachment to such ‘debris’ is ever more 
precarious, let alone desirable or indeed pleasurable. This may be so for all concerned, 
but certainly demands, expectations and rewards are unequally distributed, and require 
‘a concern for the future already among us—a future that a kind of curiosity mixed with 
a kind of willfulness one could pull out of the present’ (Povinelli 2012, 453). 
In this conjuncture, the ‘metaphorical nooks and crannies’ evoked by Strathern in her 
interview with Alan MacFarlane may no longer be productive gaps but all there is left 
of the old institution. In overly complex, ruined structures, therefore, idiosyncratic 
procedures are no longer granted any more than is the internally plural structure itself 
– something to which Strathern seems to hint with nostalgia. It goes without saying that 
what has risen out of the debris, perhaps feeding off the process of its ruination, is a 
powerful organisation – but one of a different, postplural nature, in which differences 
may be seen to proliferate only at the expense of their neutralisation. There is now wide 
consensus, among both academics and the general public, that the neoliberal university 
has progressively ceased to function as a distinct kind of institution to take the form of 
a corporation, where creativity and complexity are erased in the process of their 
valorisation and where scholars are increasingly turned into managers. Indeed, 
Strathern’s reflections on the subject (most famously her Audit Cultures edited 
collection, 2000) were crucial to illuminate aspects of this process. The question, then, 
turns to what the place and nature of discipline might be in such context. 
Thus, whilst taking inspiration and starting from her reflections on knowledge, the 
university and a number of other issues, my partial connections are obviously taking 
me to rather different directions to those trodden by Strathern. To speak of ‘queer’ from 
the point of view of academic discipline(s), of those institutions which are close to home 
for (or better, are indeed home to) all the parts in the assemblage I engage with, seems 
 
10 ‘Inside the President’s Studio – Marilyn Strathern’, interview with Virginia Dominguez, 
March 2011. Available online at https://blog.americananthro.org/2011/03/31/inside-the-
presidents-studio-marilyn-strathern/, retrieved 10 June 2017. 
 like a good way to reflect on politics from a perspective (one which owes much to 
feminist thought and critique) in which the private, intimate, personal, on the one hand, 
and the public, on the other, are themselves intimately intertwined. As Boellstorff has 
noted with specific reference to anthropology as an academic discipline, and to the 
anthropology of gender and sexuality in particular (2007: 18–19), its institutional 
context has been central to the development of queer studies, as the vector making 
certain kinds of approaches possible, indeed creating ‘homes’ for their scholars – thus 
mutually imbricating subject and object, figure and ground. Echoes of Strathern’s 
thinking surface here. 
And yet, insofar as it is on the inescapably political qualities of queer within the 
ruination of university that I wish to focus my attention – on queer as a method and 
guide for change, and thus on the ever-fraught relationship between knowledge 
production and transformative action – I am departing from Strathern’s own language, 
if not from her concerns. From this angle, I am facing an unease which the 
contemporary university as an institution built on ruins makes particularly stark in many 
ways. Indeed, while a disciplined institutionalisation of queer projects may be 
undesirable and unattainable, or at best anachronistic, for the purposes of radical 
politics, in the current academic context it is their very recognition, indeed their radical 
effect, that is at stake (cf. Borghi, Bourcier and Preiur 2016; Boyce, Engebretsen and 
Posocco 2017). More often than not, the institution acts to neutralise and appropriate 
such projects, or even to erase them. The challenge is thus that of assembling a 
subversive tool that can help us configure more just forms of knowledge-production 
and relations. Perhaps we need to renew our disciplines, once again, in order to pursue 
this project. 
This is what remains partially hidden in Strathern’s reflection on the incomparability 
between feminism and anthropology: the militant nature of the feminist project, the fact 
that it is not, in the first instance, a purely intellectual endeavour (unlike anthropology, 
at least in its canonical self-representations). This is the fundamental awkwardness that 
drives cyborg assembling – after all, cyborgs are eminently ‘political’ creatures in 
Haraway’s intentions, but being cyborgs they extend and remake the meanings of such 
politics (whilst, in Haraway’s words, remaining faithful to feminism, socialism and 
materialism). The challenge, then, after having considered feminism’s theoretical 
stance and implications, seems to be to come to terms with the political dimension of 
anthropology. What is more, it is perhaps in militancy that a sense of discipline can be 
recuperated, beyond modern institutions and as a way to create partial connections 
between scholarship and the domains it reflects on and describes. If Strathern identified 
a disconnect between radical politics and radical scholarship (1988: 27), the current 
conjuncture seems favourable for a re-articulation in which the one need not be 
conceptually conservative, or the other politically so. And this is thanks also to the work 
of feminist scholars such as Strathern and Butler, who have taught us how to be radical 
without assuming identity in its strong ontological sense. 
Of course this means constant conceptual alertness and redefinition – the point of queer 
performativity. It is discipline in its ethical sense, but one which challenges oneself and 
the institution to cast both off and regenerate them (Povinelli 2012). Another thing is to 
have a ‘well-thought out political position that translates into university dealings’ – but 
then again, how definitive would we want this position to be anyways? Is it not more a 
matter of tactical subversions and alliances (echoes of lessons learned from distant 
lands and colonial settings?), of constantly reworking our politics from the point of 
view of relations? This is what one might read in-between the lines of Strathern’s 
posture within the institution: 
 I knew right from the outset in Manchester that the one thing you need to prevent 
is a cleavage; you can have any number of prima donnas, alliances, whatever, 
but as long as the alliances keep on cross-cutting with one another, and different 
issues engage different constellations of interests, everything is fine. As soon as 
you have a cleavage in a department, a crevasse, then every issue falls into it; 
this worked in Manchester, it had to be worked at in the Cambridge department, 
but is really true of Girton, that although from time to time the Fellows divide 
themselves, and although they have to always overcome some arts-science 
divide, simply because of the different kinds of demands of the University, I 
think I can fairly say there are no divisions that have split the community. 
(Interview with Alan MacFarlane, 2009) 
Yet the activist, queer posture is not simply a realisation of the impossibilities of 
adhering to the law: it is a deliberate reclaiming of this gap, of acting conflict out – 
whereas the role of ‘head’ rather implies acting to re-compose the gap, overcome it. 
This of course can be done in a number of ways, and carries itself an activist dimension: 
to be able to detect exclusion and abjection (of women for example), and to recognise 
its political agency, is what makes for a queer ‘head’. And the reclaiming (as much as 
the re-composition perhaps) is, as noted in the beginning, propped up by analyses, ideas, 
elaborations which may include those on ‘Melanesian’ ways, knowing that things can 
be done differently, that laws need not be carved in stone and that contamination, or 
partial connection, is a possibility, indeed a political necessity. In this sense, 
paraphrasing a well-known author, if ‘Margaret Mead made us gay’ (Newton 2000), 
‘Marilyn Strathern made us queer’, both in her unsettling the grounds of gender 
identities and thereby also questioning the forms of militant politics that we deploy to 
contrast such strong forms of identification. Of course ‘Melanesians’ are a word doing 
things here, a shorthand for relationality as constitutive of selves, perhaps, in the 
awareness that what we are facing is a postplural world in which even the 
symbolic/institutional order might be in question and where, therefore, ‘queer’ might 
be defused in its subversive capacities and put to work for a regime of boundless 
consumerist enjoyment. Indeed, it is only by assuming our own vulnerability, 
deliberately assuming risk and exhausting ourselves, and recognising the violence and 
vulnerability endured by others, by those we work with, that we can turn discipline(s), 
including anthropology, into transformative projects. Queer, indeed, can only exist only 
as one of the names of this embodied, lived vulnerabilities and pains, lest it betrays 
itself. 
But to demand of ‘heads’, institutional figures par excellence, in all their radicalness (a 
radicalness that Strathern and Butler both expressed in very different guises, at least 
‘intellectually’ as Strathern would put it), to ‘queer’ knowledge or the institution is 
perhaps to miss a point. Their cyborg assemblage can only serve as a weapon in the 
hands of, and for, the abjects – the precarious, the non-subjects of neo-liberal 
institutions. It is from that position, and only from that, that subversion can proceed, 
however it is then dealt with by institutions and their heads, who might or not accept 
the challenge of recognising and owning their own precarity. But however institutions, 
or their ruins, react, that should be no reason to interrupt our efforts. 
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